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¶3ODLQO\RI&RQVLGHUDEOH0RPHQWLQ+XPDQ6RFLHW\· 
Francis Hutcheson and Polite Laughter in  
Eighteenth-Century Britain and Ireland* 
 
 
 
Kate Davison 
University of Sheffield 
 
Abstract: 7KLVDUWLFOHIRFXVHVRQ)UDQFLV+XWFKHVRQ·VReflections Upon Laughter, which was 
originally published in 1725 as a series of three letters to The Dublin Journal during his time in the 
city. $OWKRXJKUDUHO\FRQVLGHUHGDVLJQLILFDQWH[DPSOHRI+XWFKHVRQ·VSXEOLVKHGZRUNReflections 
Upon Laughter has long been recognised in the philosophy of laughter as a foundational 
contribution to the ¶incongruity theory·³RQHRIWKH¶ELJWKUHH·WKHRULHVRIODXJKWHUDQGWKDW
which is still considered the most credible by modern theorists. The article gives an account of 
+XWFKHVRQ·Vtext but, rather than evaluating it solely as an explanation of laughter, the approach 
taken is an historical one: it emphasises the need to reconnect the theory to the cultural and 
intellectual contexts in which it was published and to identify the significance of +XWFKHVRQ·V 
arguments in time and place. Through this, the DUWLFOHDUJXHVWKDW+XWFKHVRQ·VWKHRU\RIODXJKWHU
is indicative of the perceived significance of human risibility in early eighteenth-century Britain 
and Ireland and, more broadly, that it contributed both to moral philosophical debate and polite 
conduct guidance. 
 
 
Laughter in History 
 
7KHTXHVWLRQ¶ZK\GRZHODXJK"·has occupied minds in the western world since antiquity. From 
Plato to Sigmund Freud³via Aristotle, Thomas Hobbes, René Descartes, Immanuel Kant, and 
                                                 
* The research in this article was supported by the Wolfson Foundation. I would also like to thank 
Kenneth L. Pearce and Takaharu Oda for their comments on previous drafts, and participants at the Irish 
Philosophy in the Age of Berkeley Conference for their questions and discussion. 
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more³the list of those who have interrogated the causes, nature and consequences of human 
laughter is long and it reads like a roll call of canonical European philosophers. These centuries 
of scrutiny have JHQHUDWHGZKDWDUHNQRZQDVWKH¶ELJWKUHH·WKHRULHVRIODXJKWHU1 First is the 
¶VXSHULRULW\·WKHRU\it can be traced back to Aristotle and Plato, but is most commonly 
associated with Thomas Hobbes. His description of laughter in Leviathan cast it as a grimace 
WULJJHUHGE\H[SHULHQFLQJ¶VXGGHQJORU\·:HODXJKwhen we perceive ourselves in a superior 
light: it is a sneering self-applause that expresses contempt for others.2 Secondly, WKH¶UHOLHI·
theory, which is most often attributed to Sigmund Freud. His ¶K\GUDXOLFPRGHO·RISV\FKRORJ\ 
led him to view joking as means to release social tension: jokes operate as a safety valve, allowing 
a society to let off steam.3 Thirdly, the incongruity theory, which is often thought to have 
originated with Francis Hutcheson who thus holds a special place in the philosophy of laughter. 
His theory was set out in a series of three letters to the Dublin Journal in 1725, which were 
republished posthumously in 1750 in Glasgow³where he had been professor of moral 
philosophy³as Reflections Upon LaughterWRJHWKHUZLWKDFULWLTXHRI%HUQDUG0DQGHYLOOH·VFable of 
the Bees.4 Hutcheson contended that laughter is triggered by the perception of ill-suited pairings 
of ideas, objects or situations; it is our response to the coming together of things that are 
incompatible or out of place. 9DULDWLRQVRQ+XWFKHVRQ·V theory have since been proposed by a 
number of philosophers and psychologists and, of the three theories of laughter, incongruity is 
still considered to be the most persuasive.5 Yet, even now, with our rapidly developing 
understanding of the human brain, laughter retains an element of mystery. It occupies some 
psycho-somatic space: more than an emotion or feeling, it is a reaction that originates in the 
mind, but manifests in the body. +XWFKHVRQ·Vstruggle to characterise his subject still rings true: 
¶WKDWVHQVDWLRQDFWLRQSDVVLRQRUDIIHFWLRQ·KHZURWH ¶I know not which of them a philosopher 
ZRXOGFDOOLW·6 Sometimes we laugh deliberately, and other times involuntarily as an instinctive 
reaction to a moment. In both cases, though, laughter is part of our communicative repertoire; it 
                                                 
1 Noël Carroll, Humour: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). On theories of 
laughter, see for example, J. Roecklein, The Psychology of Humor: A Reference Guide and Annotated Bibliography 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2002); John Morreall (ed.), The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor (Albany, NY: 
State of New York Press, 1987); John Morreall, Comic Relief: A Comprehensive Philosophy of Laughter (Wiley-
Blackwell, 2009); Rod A. Martin, The Psychology of Humor: An Integrative Approach (Elsevier Science & 
Technology, 2006). 
2 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan [1651], ed. C. B. Macpherson (London: Penguin, 1968), I, VI, 125.  
3 Sigmund Freud, Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious [1905], trans. James Strachey (New York: 
Penguin, 1974). 
4 Francis Hutcheson, Reflections Upon Laughter, and Remarks Upon the Fable of the Bees (Glasgow, 1750). 
5 Morreall, Comic Relief, 12. 
6 Hutcheson, Reflections, 16. 
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is one of the many verbal and gestural strategies we employ while interacting with one another.7 
Moreover, it seems we have been doing so since our earliest beginnings as a species. For our 
ancestors, laughter was most likely an indication of safety and play: that of pre-verbal infants is 
thought to be a legacy of this phenomenon.8 Of those who have investigated the phenomenon 
of human laughter, then, few would disagree with HutcheVRQ·VFODLPWKDWit ¶LVSODLQO\RI
consideUDEOHPRPHQWLQKXPDQVRFLHW\·,9 even if consensus on its precise triggers and effects 
remains elusive. 
 For an historian, however, the notion that there exists a universal theory of laughter³
that what makes us laugh is transcultural and ahistorical³sets alarm bells ringing.10 Historians 
are driven to uncover the particulars of past societies and cultures, so the question LVQRW¶ZKDW
PDNHVXVODXJK"·EXWZKDWhas made people laugh in different times and places? This question 
has underpinned a subfield of research focusing on the humour of past societies.11 And with 
good reason, aV.HLWK7KRPDV·VIRXQGDWLRQDOcontribution to the field argued. ¶The historical 
study of laughter·ZURWH7KRPDV ¶brings us right up against the fundamental values of past 
VRFLHWLHV)RUZKHQZHODXJKZHEHWUD\RXULQQHUPRVWDVVXPSWLRQV·12 Thereafter the history of 
humour expanded in line with the development of FXOWXUDOKLVWRU\WKURXJKWKHVDQG¶90s, 
not least following 5REHUW'DUQWRQ·Vseminal HVVD\RQ¶7KH*UHDW&DW0DVVDFUH·LQDQ
eighteenth-century Parisian printshop. In accordance with Thomas, Darnton saw jokes as a tool 
with which to prize open past mentalities. An apparent source of historical hilarity that is deeply 
unfunny to modern readers³in this case the ritualistic slaughter of cats³exposes starkly the 
distance between past and present. Emphasising that people in the past ¶GRQRWWKLQNWKHZD\ZH
GR·'DUQWRQDUJXHGWKDWWKHHIIRUWUHTXLUHGWRH[SODLQWKHHSLVRGHXQUDYHOOHGWKHPHQWDOZRUOG
RIWKRVHLQYROYHG,Q¶JHWWLQJ·WKHMRNHKHFRXOG¶JHW·WKHLUFXOWXUH13 Now a well-established field, 
the history of humour has demonstrated that the subjects considered acceptable to laugh at, and 
how cruelly, sympathetically, exuberantly or cautiously people laugh, have all varied with time, 
                                                 
7 The anthropologist Mary Douglas has been influential in this respectVHHKHU¶-RNHV·LQImplicit Meanings: 
Essays in Anthropology, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), 90-114, DQG¶'R'RJV/DXJK"$
Cross-&XOWXUDODSSURDFKWR%RG\6\PEROLVP·LQIbid, 165-69. See also, Robert Provine, Laughter: A 
Scientific Investigation (London: Faber, 2002). 
8 0*HUYDLVDQG'6:LOVRQ¶7KH(YROXWLRQDQG)XQFWLRQVRI/DXJKWHUDQG+XPRU$6\QWKHWLF
$SSURDFK·The Quarterly Review of Biology, 80 (2005), 395-430. See also, Morreall, Comic Relief, 41-2. 
9 Hutcheson, Reflections, 32. 
10 -DQ%UHPPHUDQG+HUPDQ5RRGHQEXUJ¶,QWURGXFWLRQ·LQ-DQ%UHPPHUDQG+HUPDQ5RRGHQEXUJ
(eds), A Cultural History of Humour: From Antiquity to the Present Day, (Cambridge: Polity, 1997). 
11 -RKDQ9HUEHUFNPRHV¶+XPRXUDQG+LVWRU\$5HVHDUFK%LEOLRJUDSK\·LQ,ELG-252. 
12 .HLWK7KRPDV¶7KH3ODFHRI/DXJKWHULQ7XGRUDQG6WXDUW(QJODQG·Times Literary Supplement (21 
January 1977), 77. 
13 Robert Darnton, The Great Cat Massacre and other Episodes in French History (London: Allen Lane, 1984), 2 
and 75-104. 
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place and culture. This has generated new insights into past cultures and mentalities, along with 
the values and sensibilities of the day.14 But the history of what people have laughed at, is not³
strictly speaking³a history of laughter. Laughing is a physical and often noisy action: it is not 
synonymous with humour, at which laughter might be targeted.15 Laughing engages the body, the 
face and the vocal chords, but leaves no trace on the historical record: in an early modern 
context, we simply cannot ¶hear the people not just talking but also laughing·, as Thomas aspired 
to do.16 Yet, we do have representations of laughter³a great many of them, both written and 
visual³and we can write a history using those as source material. In this sense, the historical 
study of laughter has been more precisely defined as the study of how laughter was depicted, 
debated and interpreted by past societies.17 Studying laughter in this way is distinct from the 
approach taken in philosophies of laughter, which have discussed historical theories in depth, 
but often with a view to evaluating their accuracy. An article foFXVHGRQ+XWFKHVRQ·VReflections 
Upon Laughter is a case in point: its goal was to identify ¶WKHOLPLWDWLRQVRI+XWFKHVRQ·VDFFRXQWRI
WKHQDWXUHRIODXJKWHU·18 In contrast, this article takes an historical approach, which aims to 
account for why Hutcheson was interested in laughter, and to assess the significance of his 
arguments in time and place. Approaching laughter in this way has already revealed the extent to 
ZKLFKLW¶PDWWHUHG·LQFHUWDLQKLVWRULFDOcultures.19 And it also helps historians to tackle new 
questions in the history of humour, which concern not what people laughed at, but what that 
laughter did$V0DUN.QLJKWVDQG$GDP0RUWRQKDYHDUJXHG¶ODXJKWHUDQGVDWLUHplayed 
significant roles in political processes and social practices in a range of historical contextV·, and 
exploring this requires a focus on their reception³indeed, WKHLU¶SRZHU·20 In this pursuit, an 
understanding of how laughter was understood and thought about in the past becomes all the 
more important. 
 
                                                 
14 Notably in the case of eighteenth-century Britain, Vic Gatrell, City of Laughter: Sex and Satire in Eighteenth-
Century London (London: Walker and Company, 2006) and Simon Dickie, Cruelty and Laughter: Forgotten 
Comic Literature and the Unsentimental Eighteenth Century (London: University of Chicago Press, 2012). 
15 Mahadev L. Apte, Humor and Laughter: An Anthropological Approach (London: Cornell University Press, 
1985), 14. 
16 7KRPDV¶7KH3ODFHRI/DXJKWHU· 
17 John Verberckmoes, Laughter, Jestbooks and Society in the Spanish Netherlands (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1999), 118-9. 
18 (OL]DEHWK7HOIHU¶+XWFKHVRQ·V5HIOHFWLRQV8SRQ/DXJKWHU·, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 53 
(1995), 359. 
19 4XHQWLQ6NLQQHU¶:K\/DXJKLQJ0DWWHUHGLQWKH5HQDLVVDQFH·History of Political Thought, 22 (2001), 
418-447. 
20 0DUN.QLJKWVDQG$GDP0RUWRQ¶,QWURGXFWLRQ·LQ0DUN.QLJKWVDQG$GDP0RUWRQHGVThe Power of 
Laughter and Satire in Early Modern Britain: Political and Religious Culture, 1500-1820 (Woodbridge: The 
Boydell Press, 2017), 1. 
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Laughter and Eighteenth-Century Politeness 
 
Eighteenth-century Britain is particularly fertile ground for a history of laughter as it was 
subjected to an heightened level of investigation and anxiety, which generated abundant material 
for historians to pore over. Such interest was bound up with WKHSHULRG·s well-documented 
preoccupation with politeness.21 In the first instance, politeness was a discourse of manners; it 
denoted refinement of behaviour and personal demeanour, which ¶the polite· would exercise 
when interacting with others. It was discussed and elucidated by the influential essays of Joseph 
Addison and Richard Steele in The Spectator in the early century, and subsequent didactic literature 
codified polite prescriptions in detail, covering everything from how to converse agreeably to 
how to stand, dance the minuet, or greet a passer-by on the street.22 Laughter had an ambivalent 
relationship with such consciously urbane and decorous forms.23 On one hand, cheerfulness, 
wittiness and geniality were crucial to polite encounters, as -RQDWKDQ6ZLIW·VTreatise on Polite 
Conversation (1738) indicates. In the preface, Swift QRWHGWKDWWKHUHZDVD¶&DXVHRI/DXJKWHU
ZKLFK'HFHQF\UHTXLUHV·DQGZKHQZHOO judged, laughter in conversation was ¶XQGRXEWHGWKH
0DUNRIDJRRG7DVWHDVZHOODVRISROLWHDQGREOLJLQJ%HKDYLRXU·24 On the other hand, laughing 
defied polite aspirations for self-mastery and genteel conversation. Physically, laughter was often 
an uncontrollable response³and it could be hearty too, shaking the body, crumpling the face 
and even making the eyes weep. It was such bodily contortions that the fourth earl of 
Chesterfield famously took issue with in his letters to his son, which subsequently formed the 
basis of several conduct guides. He wrote, 
 
+DYLQJPHQWLRQHGODXJKLQJ,PXVWSDUWLFXODUO\ZDUQ\RXDJDLQVWLW>«@)UHTXHQWORXG
laughter is the characteristic of folly and ill manners; it is the manner in which the mob 
express their silly joy at silly things; and they call it being merry. In my mind there is 
nothing so illiberal, and so ill-bred, as audible laughter. 
 
He continued in the same vein, observing ¶KRZORZDQGXQEHFRPLQJDWKLQJODXJKWHULVQRWWR
mention the disagreeable noise that it makes, and the shocking distortion of the face that it 
                                                 
21 3DXO/DQJIRUG¶7KH8VHVRI(LJKWHHQWK-&HQWXU\3ROLWHQHVV·Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 
series 6, 12 (2002), 311-332; /DZUHQFH(.OHLQ¶3ROLWHQHVVDQd the Interpretation of the British 
(LJKWHHQWK&HQWXU\·The Historical Journal, 45 (2002), 869-898. 
22 See, for example, Anon., The Polite Academy, or School of Behaviour for Young Gentlemen and Ladies (London, 
1762). 
23 For a full discussion, see Kate DaviVRQ¶2FFDVLRQDO3ROLWHQHVVDQG*HQWOHPHQ·V/DXJKWHULQth 
&HQWXU\(QJODQG·The Historical Journal, 57 (2014), 921-945. 
24 Jonathan Swift, A Treatise on Polite Conversation (London, 1738), v.  
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RFFDVLRQV·25 In a later letter, Chesterfield dwelled upon another concern regarding ODXJKWHU·V
compatibility with polite behaviour: its targets. Registering his GLVWDVWHIRUWKH¶VLOO\WKLQJV· that 
triggered much laughter, he warned that, 
 
Horse-play, romping, frequent loud fits of laughter, jokes, waggery, and indiscriminate 
familiarity, will sink both merit and knowledge into a degree of contempt. They compose 
a most merry fellow; and a merry fellow was never yet a respectable man.26 
 
Sure enough, even a passing acquaintance with eighteenth-century satirical literature, jestbooks 
or caricature reveals how cUXGHWKHSHULRG·Vcomic tastes could be.27 Sexual, scatological and 
cruel humour was as germane to the age as Palladian architecture and Wedgewood tea services. 
Along with its uncontrolled physicality and impolite targets, there was also anxiety about the 
effects of laughter in social interaction: laughing at others was widely understood as potentially 
aggressive and thus not conducive to genial encounters.28 Given both the intricacy of polite 
FRQGXFWJXLGDQFHDQGUHFRJQLWLRQRIODXJKWHU·VSUHYDOHQFHLQVRFLDOVLWXDWLRQVLWLVXQVXUSULVLQJ
to find so much ink spilled over how to laugh in company, where, when and what at. 
But politeness also reached beyond a narrow concern with external behaviour, and 
laughter was implicated in this respect too. In the hands of Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third 
earl of Shaftesbury, politeness embraced questions of inner morality and virtue so that it might, 
as he put it, ¶FDUU\Good-Breeding DVWHSKLJKHU·29 6KDIWHVEXU\·V writings from the early century 
anchored politeness in philosophy: it was not simply a matter of superficial social behaviour, 
politeness concerned the more profound appreciation of beauty, harmony and good order. 
TheVHLGHDVJDLQHGSXUFKDVHRXWVLGHVFKRODUO\GHEDWHWKURXJKWKHHOHYDWLRQRI¶WDVWH·LQ
eighteenth-century culture. Described in the mid-FHQWXU\DV¶WKHGDUOLQJLGRORI WKHSROLWHZRUOG· 
the meaning of taste extended beyond gastronomy to denote the capacity to discern and take 
pleasure in the subtle qualities of practically anything, from a well-proportioned landscape to 
wallpaper or, indeed, a witty remark.30 Taste was aspirational: while in theory everyone had the 
                                                 
25 Bonamy Dobrée (ed.), The Letters of Philip Dormer Stanhope 4th earl of Chesterfield, (6 vols, London: Eyre and 
Spottiswoode, 1932), III, 114-8: to his son, 9 March 1748. 
26 Ibid., IV, 1379-82: to his son, 10 August 1749. 
27 This material has been explored in depth in Gatrell, City of Laughter, esp. 178-210, and Dickie, Cruelty and 
Laughter. 
28 See, for example, Samuel Smilewell, The Art of Joking (London, 1774). The ambivalent attitude to 
ODXJKWHULQVRFLDOHQFRXQWHUVLVGLVFXVVHGLQ&DWK\6KUDQN¶0RFNLQJRI0LUWKIXO"/DXJKWHULQWKH(DUO\
ModHUQ'LDORJXH·LQ.QLJKWVDQG0RUWRQThe Power of Laughter, 48-66. 
29 Anthony Ashley Cooper, third earl of Shaftesbury, The Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times (3 
vols, London, 1711), III, 161. On Shaftesbury and politeness, see Lawrence E. Klein, Shaftesbury and the 
Culture of Politeness: Moral Discourse and Cultural Politics in Early Eighteenth-Century England (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994).  
30 The Connoisseur, 721 (13 May, 1756). 
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capacity for it, only some cultivated it.31 For Shaftesbury, such aesthetic appreciation was guided 
by an internal ¶moral VHQVH· that, if trained, enabled humankind to fulfil its natural capability for 
virtue. Hence a refined taste indicated inner virtue and morality. Hutcheson expanded on 
Shaftesbury, especially by setting out a number of internal senses, including beauty, harmony, 
grandeur, novelty and order, which operate as reflex responses to the perception of certain 
objects.32 This theory of internal senses was set out in his Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of 
Beauty and Virtue (1725), but it was also elaborated in a less canonical text: his three letters to the 
Dublin Journal about laughter. For Hutcheson, laughter was a reflex that revealed the workings of 
our internal senses and aesthetic judgements. And he was not alone on this front: later in the 
century James Beattie took up a similar theme,33 but before +XWFKHVRQ·V letters even became 
Reflections Upon Laughter in 1750, the German philosopher Georg Friedrich Meier (1718-1777) 
had gone a step further by explicitly arguing that jesting was a branch of aesthetic philosophy. 
0HLHU·V Thoughts on Jesting was a two-hundred-page exposition on how best to jest in company.34 
:KDWKHFDOOHGD¶KDSS\-HVW·ZDV¶GLVWLQJXLVKed from Buffoonery and Indecent 'UROOHU\·E\LWV
¶&RQIRUPLW\WRWKH5XOHVRIWKH%HDXW\RIRXUVHQVLWLYH.QRZOHGJH· 
 
And thus it is a Part, which is within the Province of the fine Arts: And a Research into 
the Perfections thereof must be considered as a Branch of what is called the Aesthetic.35 
 
The combinations of objects that any given person saw fit to laugh at revealed their judgement, 
morality and, of course, taste.  
 
As it is always an indication of a vitiated low Taste, either to jest in an insipid Manner 
oneself, or to approve the low, insipid Jests of others; and on the contrary, always Proof 
of a refined Taste, never to jest but in a sprightly Manner, and never to approve but 
sprightly Jests.36 
 
Discussions of laughter were thus entangled with politeness on several levels. Politeness resided 
in conversation and laughter was recognised as an important part of shariQJRQHDQRWKHU·V
company, even if conduct guidance remained ambivalent about its effects on social interaction. 
More profoundly, laughter offered insights into the questions driving moral philosophers and 
                                                 
31 John Brewer, The Pleasures of the Imagination: English Culture in the Eighteenth Century (London: Harper 
Collins, 1997), 88-92. 
32 -DPHV$+DUULV¶6KDIWHVEXU\+XWFKHVRQDQGWKH0RUDO6HQVH·LQ6DFKD*ROREDQG-HQV7LPPHUPDQQ
(eds), The Cambridge History of Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 325-337. 
33 -DPHV%HDWWLH¶2Q/DXJKWHUDQG/XGLFURXV&RPSRVLWLRQ·LQEssays (London, 1776). 
34 Georg Friedrich Meier, Gedanken von Scherzen [Hemmerde, 1744], trans. Anon., The Merry Philosopher; or, 
Thoughts on Jesting (London, 1765). 
35 Ibid., 11. 
36 Ibid., 14. 
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hence attracted their scrutiny. Laughing aloud was an external behaviour that revealed the 
workings of the internal senses and aesthetic judgements. Getting it right was not just a matter of 
EHLQJ¶SROLWH·LQWKHVHQVHRIEHLQJDQDJUHHDEOHFRPSDQLRQEXWDOVRLQWKHVHQVHRIH[SUHVVLQJ
refined taste and inner virtue. 
In these respects, the culture of politeness in eighteenth-century Britain provides 
LPSRUWDQWFRQWH[WLQZKLFKWRUHDG+XWFKHVRQ·VReflections Upon Laughter. Not least, it is reminder 
that Hutcheson was not writing in isolation, but as part of³and in response to³ongoing 
debates about human risibility, its meaning and significance in society. And, furthermore, that 
these debates were themselves part of both scholarly philosophical inquiry into human nature, 
and wider cultural commentary on the nature of polite manners. +XWFKHVRQ·VReflections Upon 
Laughter was a conscious effort to rescue laughter from the trappings of Hobbesian self-interest 
by rethinking what triggers laughter, but it also upheld moral philosopK\·VZLGHUFULWLTXHRI
selfishness as the key human motivation: not for nothing was it later published with a critique of 
Mandeville. Far from being aggressive and haughty, for Hutcheson, laughter spoke of the natural 
benevolence of human nature and was crucial to the workings of a polite society. He cast 
laughter as a pleasant aspect of sociability, which helped to achieve the mutually pleasing and 
genial interactions to which polite society aspired; moreover, it offered a gentle means to correct 
foibles and follies without causing offence³particularly useful when good natured relations were 
the aspiration. 
If the intellectual and cultural context is important for understanding what was at stake 
for Hutcheson when arguing about laughter, the contexts of original publication also have 
implications for how his theory should be interpreted. The usual citation is the 1750 edition, 
Reflections Upon Laughter, but the original text was written for an audience of newspaper readers 
and coffeehouse goers³the urbane gentlemen of early eighteenth-century Dublin. At the time, 
the city was home to a thriving print culture7KHSULQWLQJPRQRSRO\KHOGE\WKHNLQJ·VSULQWHU
since the mid-sixteenth century had been eroded by the end of the seventeenth century, as 
unlicensed printers and booksellers operated without challenge. The industry grew steadily 
thereafter, partly due to the lack of copyright law (established in England in 1710) which allowed 
Dublin printers to prosper by producing cheaper editions of bestsellers, copied from the 
originals exported from London for sale in Ireland.37 $VWKHVHFRQGFLW\LQ%ULWDLQ·VH[SDQGLQJ
                                                 
37 0iLUH.HQQHG\¶¶3ROLWLFNV&RIIHHDQG1HZV·7KH'XEOLQ%RRN7UDGHLQWKH(LJKWHHQWK&HQWXU\·
Dublin Historical Record, 58 (2005), 76-&KDUOHV%HQVRQ¶7KH,ULVK7UDGH·LQ6XDUH]6-0LFKDHO)DQG
Michael L. Turner (eds), The Cambridge History of Book in Britain, Volume 5: 1695-1830 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 371. 
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colonial empire, Dublin was an important urban centre and not short of spaces of sociability in 
which the Dublin Journal would have been read. In coffeehouses and taverns, newspapers and 
SHULRGLFDOVZHUHDYDLODEOHIRUSDWURQV·SHUXVDO5HDGLQJZDVIUHTXHQWO\ a social activity at this 
time and papers like the Dublin Journal were read aloud, debated, and discussed by those 
present³typically gentlemen of the middling and upper sorts.38 This readership sets the tone of 
+XWFKHVRQ·VZULWLQJDVZHOODVWKHVXEMHFWPDWWHU/DXJKWHUZDVDWRSLFRIFRQFHUQfor those 
preoccupied by politeness and Hutcheson caters for his readers by treating it somewhat playfully, 
even noting the irony of exploring it with such gravity.39 The text is shot through with his moral 
philosophy and his theory of the internal senses, but it is packaged for a wide reading public of 
edXFDWHGJHQWOHPHQ,WLVWKHGHILQLWLRQRI$GGLVRQ·VDVSLUDWLRQLQThe Spectator to ¶KDYHEURXJKW
Philosophy out of Closets and Libraries, Schools and Colleges, to dwell in Clubs and Assemblies, 
at Tea-Tables, and in Coffee-+RXVHV·40 In these respects, Hutcheson was consciously providing 
a prompt for coffeehouse conversation by wading into ongoing debates about laughter and how 
to behave politely. He was not describing things as they were, but how he believed they should be: 
his text served a prescriptive purpose. No less than Addison, Steele, Shaftesbury and others, his 
Reflections Upon Laughter was part of the effort to cultivate and refine minds, morals and tempers 
that was at the heart of the politeness project. 
 
 
Refuting D¶SDOSDEOHDEVXUGLW\· 
 
7KHILUVWRI+XWFKHVRQ·VWKUHHOHWWHUVLVFRQFHUQHGZLWKUHIXWLQJ+REEHV·VDFFRXQWRIODXJKWHU, 
which was well known at the time.41 ¶0U+REEHV·KHbegins¶RZHVKLVFKDUDFWHURID
Philosopher to his assuming positive solemn airs, which he uses most when he is going to assert 
some palpable absurdity, or some ill-QDWXUHGQRQVHQVH·42 7KH¶SDOSDEOHDEVXUGLW\·LQTXHVWLRQon 
this occasion was Hobbes·V description of laughter in Leviathan, which Hutcheson quotes: 
 
                                                 
38 -RQDWKDQ%DUU\¶/LWHUDF\DQG/LWHUDWXUHLQ3RSXODU&XOWXUH5HDGLQJDQG:ULWLQJLQ+LVWRULFDO
3HUVSHFWLYH·LQ7LP+DUULVHGPopular Culture in England, c.1500-1850 (London: Macmillan, 1997), 76-9. 
On coffeehouses, see Brian Cowan, The Social Life of Coffee: The Emergence of the British Coffeehouse (London: 
Yale University Press, 2005). 
39 Hutcheson, Reflections, 26. 
40 The Spectator, no. 10 (12 March 1711). 
41 -RVHSK$GGLVRQGLVFXVVHG+REEHV·VWKHRU\RIODXJKWHULQThe Spectator, no. 47 (24 April 1711), which 
JDYHLWDZLGHUFLUFXODWLRQ-DPHV%HDWWLHQRWHGWKDW+REEHV·VWKHRU\¶ZRXOGKDUGO\KDYHGHVHUYHGQRWLFH·
had LWQRWEHHQIRU$GGLVRQ·V essay: see Beattie¶2Q/DXJKWHU· 
42 Hutcheson, Reflections, 6. 
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Laughter is nothing else but sudden glory, arising from some sudden conception of some 
eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own 
formerly: for men laugh at the follies of themselves past, when they come suddenly to 
rememberance.43 
 
While allowing that Hobbes might EHRQWRVRPHWKLQJLQWKHFDVHRIULGLFXOLQJRWKHUV·IROOLHV44 
Hutcheson has no truck with his theory as a general account of laughter. Reducing laughter to an 
expression of sneering self-applause was to be expected of a philosopher ZKRVH¶JUDQGYLHZZDV
to GHGXFHDOOKXPDQDFWLRQVIURP6HOI/RYH·. +REEHVKDG¶RYHU-looked every thing which is 
generous RUNLQGLQPDQNLQG·³perhaps, Hutcheson quippedRQDFFRXQWRI¶VRPHEDG
PLVIRUWXQH·³and instead suspected ¶all friendship, love, or social affection, for hypocrisy, or 
VHOILVKGHVLJQ·45 Such a view of human nature was contrary to Hutcheson·V moral philosophy, 
EXW+REEHV·VWKHRU\ of laughter could also be undermined on logical grounds. If all laughter 
springs from a sense of superiority, then Hutcheson notes that two suppositions must be true: 
first, that there can be no laughter either when there is no comparison being made between 
ourselves and another object, or when that comparison does not make us feel superior; and, 
secondly, that we must laugh every time we perceive ourselves as superior to another object. As 
+XWFKHVRQSRLQWVRXW¶LIERWKWKHVHFRQFOXVLRQVEHIDOVHWKHQRWLRQIURPZKHQFHWKH\DUH
GUDZQPXVWEHVRWRR·DQGWKXVKHVHWVDERXWDWZR-pronged attack to confound Hobbes·V
position.46 
  First, he recounts causes of laughter that cannot be attributed to our sense of 
superiority. The delight we experience when we encounter wit in the writing and speech of 
others, for example, cannot be attributed self-DSSODXVH:HPLJKWKDYH¶WKHKLJKHVWYHQHUDWLRQ
fRUWKHZULWLQJDOOXGHGWRDQGDOVRDGPLUHWKHZLWRIWKHSHUVRQZKRPDNHVWKHDOOXVLRQ·. Were 
we to compare ourselves, we are more likely to feel ¶JUDYHDQGVRUURZIXO·DWRXURZQ
shortcomings than we are to delight in self-love.47 Secondly, Hutcheson argues that we 
frequently experience moments in life when we perceive our own superiority, but this rarely 
triggers our laughter. This he describes as ¶WKHPRVWREYLRXVWKLQJLPDJLQDEOH·, and indeed it 
would have appeared so to an elite, white, gentleman living in a deeply unequal society. As he 
sarcastically notes in his first example, 
 
It must be a very merry state in which a fine gentleman is, when well dressed, in his 
coach, he passes our streets, where he will see so many ragged beggars, and porters and 
                                                 
43 Ibid., 6. 
44 Ibid., 13 (discussed below). 
45 Ibid., 6. 
46 Ibid., 7. 
47 Ibid., 9-10. 
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chairmen sweating at their labour, on every side of him. It is a great pity that we had not 
an infirmary or lazar-house to retire to in cloudy weather, to get an afternoon of 
Laughter at these inferior objects.48 
 
And so it ought to follow that an obedienWDQGIDLWKIXO&KULVWLDQ¶PXVWDOZD\VEHPHUU\XSRQ
heretics, to whom he is so much superior in his RZQRSLQLRQ·ZKLOH¶DOOWUXHPHQRIVHQVH>«@
PXVWEHWKHPHUULHVWOLWWOHJULJVLPDJLQDEOH·Moreover, Hutcheson argues, the greater the gulf 
between ourseOYHVDQGWKHREMHFWRIRXUODXJKWHU¶WKHJUHDWHUZRXOGEHWKHMHVW·7KXVKH
wonders playfully,  
 
Strange! that none of our Hobbists banish all Canary birds and squirrels, and lap-dogs 
and pugs, and cats out of their houses, and substitute in their places asses, and owls, and 
snails, and oysters, to be merry upon. From these they might have higher joys of 
superiority, than from those with whom we now please ourselves.49 
 
If superiority alone is not fit to explain laughter, what is? This is the question posed by 
Hutcheson in his second letter and the answer he gives is as follows: 
 
That which seems generally to be the cause of Laughter, is the bringing together of 
images which have contrary additional ideas, as well as some resemblance in the principle 
idea: this contrast between ideas of grandeur, dignity, sanctity, perfection, and ideas of 
meanness, baseness, profanity seems to be the very spirit of burlesque; and the greatest 
part of our raillery and jest is founded upon it.50 
 
For Hutcheson, the cause of laughter is found in our response to combinations of objects 
around us, in particular when contrasting objects are found to bear an unexpected resemblance. 
In making this argument, Hutcheson develops the ideas of others, notably Joseph Addison to 
whom he refers directly. In The Spectator no. 62, Hutcheson notes, Addison ruminated on John 
/RFNH·VGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQMXGJHPHQWDQGZLW7KHIRUPHU/RFNHKDGGHVFULEHGDVWKHFDSDFLW\
to separate ideas from one another, whereas wit lay in the reverse:  
 
the Assemblage of Ideas, and putting those together with Quickness and Variety, 
wherein can be found any Resemblance or Congruity thereby to make up pleasant 
Pictures and agreeable Visions in the Fancy.51 
 
In The Spectator, Addison descrLEHG/RFNH·VDFFRXQWDV¶WKHEHVWDQGPRVWSKLORVRSKLFDO$FFRXQW
that I have ever met with of Wit·EXW added the importance of unexpectedness: not every 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 11. 
49 Ibid., 12. 
50 Ibid., 19. 
51 Ibid., 18-19. See also The Spectator, no. 62 (11 May 1711) and John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding (London, 1690), 68. 
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resemblance is witty¶XQOHVVLWEHVXFKDQRQHWKDWJLYHVDelight and Surprize·$QGKHLOOXVWUDWHd 
his point with an example: 
 
Thus when a Poet tells us, the Bosom of his Mistress is as white as Snow, there is no Wit 
in the Comparison; but when he adds with a Sigh, that it is as cold too, then it grows to 
Wit.52 
 
For Addison, as for Hutcheson, comic amusement results from a surprising similarity between 
two ostensibly divergent objects.  
Hutcheson differs, however, by extending his theory to encompass our perception more 
generally of things out of place³a straightforward coming together of contrasting objects with 
incompatible ideas attached to them. This provides an explanation for why we laugh at things 
that could not be described as witty in the Addisonian sense. To demonstrate his point, he 
amasses observations from everyday life. ¶$Q\OLWWOHDFFLGHQWWRZKLFKZHKDYHMRLQHGWKHLGHDRI
PHDQQHVVEHIDOOLQJDSHUVRQRIJUHDWJUDYLW\DELOLW\GLJQLW\·KHZULWHV¶LVDPDWWHURI/DXJKWHU·
7KLVLQFOXGHV¶WKHVWUDQJHFRQWRUWLRQVRIWKHERG\LQDIDOODQGWKHGLUW\LQJRI DGHFHQWGUHVV·RU
HYHQ¶WKHQDWXUDOIXQFWLRQVZKLFKZHVWXG\WRFRQFHDOIURPVLJKW·, especially if observed in 
¶SHUVRQVRIZKRPZHKDYHKLJKLGHDV·53 He is swift to add that slip-ups are amusing no matter 
who the perpetrator, since the human form is generally associated with lofty ideas, but the joke is 
all the better in proportion to the gravity and dignity of those involved. A second example 
Hutcheson gives of a ludicrous incongruity is when violent passions are raised in response to a 
minor concern, anGDWKLUGZKHQZULWLQJWKDW¶KDVREWDLQHGDQKLJKFKDUDFWHUIRUJUDQGHXU
VDQFWLW\LQVSLUDWLRQRUVXEOLPLW\RIWKRXJKWV·³such as scripture or ancient philosophy³is 
DSSOLHGWR¶ORZYXOJDURUEDVHVXEMHFWV·,QERWKFDVHVWKHFRPELQDWLRQ¶QHYHUIDLOVWRdivert the 
audience, and set them a-ODXJKLQJ·54 An example of what Hutcheson might have had in mind 
here is offered by a ballad called The Tippling Philosophers. The work of the prolific and popular 
VDWLULVW(GZDUG¶1HG·:DUG-1731), it was originally published in 1710, but remained 
popular throughout the century; indeed, James Beattie used what he called ¶WKDWH[FHOOHQW(QJOLVK
EDOODG·to illustrate one variety of laughter-triggering incongruity.55 Each verse gleefully asserted 
that the wisdom of ancient thinkers owed much to wine: ¶$ULVWRWOHWKDW0DVWHURI$UWV·EHJDQ
RQH¶Had been but a Dunce without Wine,/And what we ascribe to his Parts,/Is but due to the 
Juice of the Vine·.56 And another, in full: 
                                                 
52 The Spectator, no. 62 (11 May 1711). 
53 Hutcheson, Reflections, 21. 
54 Ibid., 19-22. 
55 Ned Ward, Wine and Wisdom; or, the Tipling Philosophers (London, 1710); %HDWWLH¶2Q/DXJKWHU·60-361. 
56 Ibid., 14-15. 
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Old Socrates QH·HUZDVcontent, 
7LOODERWWOHKDGKHLJKWHQ·GKLV-R\V 
:KRLQ·V&XSVWRWKH2UDFOHZHQW 
2UKHQH·HUKDGEHHQFRXQWHGVR:LVH 
/DWH+RXUVKHFHUWDLQO\ORY·G 
Made Wine the delight of his Life, 
Or Xantippe ZRXOGQHYHUKDGSURY·G 
Such a damnable Scold of a Wife.57 
 
In the preface, Ward described the tavern sociability in which the ballad was first extemporised, 
before it was embellished and published for others to sing while enjoying a drink of their own. 
The dignity of ancient philosophy humbled by the more lowly subject of drinking: this was 
exactly the kind of incongruous juxtaposition of ideas that Hutcheson identified as ludicrous.  
+XWFKHVRQ·VWKHRU\ of laughter thus has a wide remit, covering words and actions to 
explain why we laugh in diverse situations, but in each case the perception of incongruity 
between two objects is crucial. In this respect, it leans heavily upon his notion of the internal 
senses, which held that certain ideas occur to us whenever we perceive objects or scenes. This 
becomes clear in the opening passages of his second letter. Referring specifically to the workings 
of the internal senses, as he saw them, he DUJXHVWKDWKXPDQQDWXUHKDV¶DJUHDW number of 
perceptions, which one can scarcely reduce to any of the five senses, as they are commonly 
explained; such as either the ideas of grandeur, dignity, decency, beauty, harmony; or, on the 
RWKHUKDQGRIPHDQQHVVEDVHQHVVLQGHFHQF\GHIRUPLW\·. These different ideas are associated in 
our minds with material objects, people, and actions, as a result of education, culture, or their 
natural resemblance. As Hutcheson put it, 
 
For instances of these associations, partly from nature, partly from custom, we may take 
the following ones; sanctity in our churches, magnificence in public buildings, affection 
between the oak and ivy, the elm and vine; hospitality in a shade, a pleasant sense of 
JUDQGHXULQWKHVN\WKHVHDDQGPRXQWDLQV>«] solemnity and horror in shady woods. 
An ass is the common emblem of stupidity and sloth, a swine or selfish luxury >«@6RPH
inanimate objects have in like manner some accessary ideas of meanness, either for some 
natural reason, oftener by mere chance and custom.58 
 
Laughter is triggered when we perceive associations that are incongruous or unexpected, either 
LQWKHLUFRQWUDVWEHWZHHQ¶KLJK·DQG¶ORZ·³sanctity and profanity, say³or by their surprising 
similarity. When this occurs to us, it is not our sense of beauty or harmony that is excited, but 
                                                 
57 Ibid., 4-5. 
58 Hutcheson, Reflections, 18. 
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another internal sense: RXU¶sense of WKHULGLFXORXV·59 For Hutcheson, we experience the world 
through learned patterns, and laugh when we perceive some disruption to our expectations, or to 
the routine ways in which we apprehend objects around us. 
 0RGHUQWKHRULVWVKDYHGHVFULEHG+XWFKHVRQ·VH[SODQDWLRQRIODXJKWHUDVDQ¶LQFLSLHQW
LQFRQJUXLW\WKHRU\·³WKHSUHFXUVRURUILUVWDWWHPSWDWRQHRIWKH¶ELJWKUHH·WKHRULHVRIODXJKWHU
and that which is still considered most credible by philosophers and psychologists.60 It is 
commonplace in philosophies of laughter to trace a direct line between Hutcheson and modern 
contributions to the debate. One recent survey, for example, gave a EULHIDFFRXQWRI+XWFKHVRQ·V
contribution before describing the incongruity theory in terms he would have well understood: 
 
According to the incongruity theory, what is key to comic amusement is a deviation from 
some presupposed norm³that is to say, an anomaly or an incongruity relative to some 
framework governing the ways in which we think the world is or should be.61  
 
Yet, if we set aside the perspective of hindsight, a different picture emerges. It becomes clear 
that, for Hutcheson, laughter was a vehicle for his broader philosophical arguments. Logical 
observation demonstrated that laughter could not be reduced to self-love: there was a good-
natured variety that ran counter not just to +REEHV·VFRPPHQWVRQODXJKWHUbut to his brutish 
notion of human nature more generally. By explaining what did cause laughter, Hutcheson also 
interjects an account of the internal senses. His theory of laughter, therefore, is freighted with 
significance to contemporary philosophical debates beyond questions of human risibility. 
Moreover, by writing for an audience of gentlemen coffeehouse goers, he was projecting his 
ideas outside the confines of scholarly debate. There was more at stake than an explanation of 
laughter; in the context of eighteenth-century philosophy, +XWFKHVRQ·VWKHRU\ was an argument 
about human nature, and he was writing to persuade a wide audience. 
 
 
7KH¶SURSHUXVH·RI/DXJKWHU 
 
Having dismissed HobbesDQGVHWRXWZKDWODWHUEHFDPHNQRZQDVWKH¶LQFRQJUXLW\·WKHRU\LQ
KLVWKLUGOHWWHU+XWFKHVRQWXUQVWRODXJKWHU·VFRQVHTXHQFHV. These too have important 
ramifications in their eighteenth-century context, especially concerning the maintenance of 
politeness in society. ¶,WPD\EHZRUWKRXUSDLQV·KHEHJins¶WRFRQVLGHUWKHHIIHFWVRI/DXJKWHU
                                                 
59 Ibid., 27. 
60 McDonald, The Philosophy of Humour, 49. 
61 Carroll, A Very Short Introduction, 17. 
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and the ends for which it was implanted in our nature·62 These two considerations address what 
laughter is for in human society and his findings fall into three arguments: first that laughter is a 
means of procuring pleasure; secondly, that it facilitates goodwill and amicable social encounters; 
and thirdly, that it can persuade people to correct their foibles without causing offence. 
7RJHWKHUWKHVHFRPSULVHZKDW+XWFKHVRQGHVFULEHVDV¶WKHSURSHUXVH·RIODXJKWHU63 but he is at 
pains to add a QXPEHURIFDYHDWVHVSHFLDOO\FRQFHUQLQJODXJKWHU·VWDUJHWVDQGwho is laughing. 
 Beginning with the first of +XWFKHVRQ·V arguments, he considers laughter to have a 
reciprocal relationship with pleasure. The act of laughing is a pleasurable act, and feeling pleasure 
renders us more apt to laugh:  
 
Laughter is an easy and agreeable state, that the recurring or suggestion of ludicrous 
images tends to dispel fretfulness, anxiety, or sorrow, and to reduce the mind to an easy, 
happy state; as on the other hand, an easy and happy state is that in which we are most 
lively and acute in perceiving the ludicrous in objects: anything that gives us pleasure, 
puts us also in a fitness for Laughter. 
 
Hence, he continues, our ¶VHQVHRIWKHULGLFXORXV·provides ¶DQDYHQXHWRSOHDVXUHDQGDQHDV\
UHPHG\IRUGLVFRQWHQWDQGVRUURZ·64 That WKLVZDVWKHILUVWRIODXJKWHU·VSXUSRVHVIRU+XWFKHVRQ
is characteristic of eighteenth-century thought. Whereas Classical and Christian philosophical 
traditions had been uneasy about the morality of seeking pleasures of the body and mind, 
Hutcheson was part of a new way of thinking that accepted pleasure as a natural means to 
fulfilment. In particular, he contributed to the philosophical reworking of how human 
motivation was understood, which gave these new ideas about pleasure momentum. The 
Hobbesian conception of human nature held people to be driven primarily by self-preservation, 
leading inevitably to competition and conflict, but moral philosophers saw in human nature a 
natural benevolence. Pleasure is not found in egoistic hedonism, but in altruism, sympathy and 
sociability: it could therefore be virtuous and gratification of the senses is not reserved for the 
afterlife, but could, and should, be sought in this world.65  
Laughter is particularly beneficial, though, because it is not a lonely pleasure. Modern 
studies have shown that we are more likely to laugh when we are with other people,66 but 
Hutcheson too observes that laughing is primarily something we do together, and it is infectious. 
                                                 
62 Hutcheson, Reflections, 27. 
63 Ibid., 26. 
64 Ibid., 26-7. 
65 5R\3RUWHU¶(QOLJKWHQPHQWDQG3OHDVXUH·LQ5R\3RUWHUDQG0DULH0XOYH\5REHUWVHGVPleasure in the 
Eighteenth-Century (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), 4-10. 
66 Martin, The Psychology of Humor6HHDOVRIRUH[DPSOH5REHUW3URYLQH¶/DXJKWHU·American Scientist, 
84 (1996), 38-45. 
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As he DUJXHGODXJKWHU¶LVYHU\FRQWDJLRXV; our whole frame is so sociable, that one merry 
countenance ma\GLIIXVHFKHDUIXOQHVVWRPDQ\·In this respect, it fosters good nature and 
geniality:  
 
It is a great occasion of pleasure, and enlivens our conversation exceedingly, when it is 
conducted by good nature. It spreads pleasantry of temper over multitudes at once; and 
one merry easy mind may by this means diffuse a like disposition over all who are in 
company. There is nothing of which we are more communicative than a good jest.67 
 
This passage casts laughter as a vital tool in the service of sociability, which was one of the most 
commendable activities in the pursuit of politeness. As the government of the self and of social 
relations, politeness was situated above all in the realm of interaction and exchange. Meeting and 
mixing with fellow humans was thought to have a refining influence on manners and morals.68 
As Shaftesbury put it in The Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times¶:HSROLVKRQH
another, and rub off our Corners and rough Sides by a sort of DPLFDEOH&ROOLVLRQ·.69 His 
reference to ¶DPLFDEOHFROOLVLRQ·LVVLJQLILFDQWEHFDXVHSROLWHQHVVDVSLUHGQRWMXVWWRVRFLDO
interaction, but specifically to social accord. To this end, it called for an open, natural and easy 
personal manner that rested between the two extremes of frivolous hypersociability and frigid 
unsociability. The perfect demeanour was neither flighty and frolicsome nor grave and serious. 
The Spectator captured this sentiment when it argued for the benefits of cheerfulness over mirth. 
7KHIRUPHULWFRQVLGHUHGWREH¶DQ+DELWRI0LQG· that was ¶IL[·GDQGSHUPDQHQW· and much 
SUHIHUDEOHWRWKHODWWHUZKLFKZDV¶VKRUWDQGWUDQVLHQW· 
 
Mirth is like a Flash of Lightning, that breaks thro a Gloom of Clouds, and glitters for a 
Moment; Chearfulness keeps up a kind of Day-light in the Mind, and fills it with a steady 
and perpetual Serenity. 
 
As VXFKD¶FKHDUIXO7HPSHU·ZRXOGbe ¶SOHDVLQJWRRXUVHOYHV·DQG¶WKRVe with whom we 
FRQYHUVH·70 This is the VDPHVHQWLPHQWWKDWXQGHUSLQQHG6ZLIW·Vcomments on well-judged 
laughter in his treatise On Polite Conversation discussed above; indeed, the desirability of 
cheerfulness elaborated on an enduring tradition of thought that rested upon the Aristotelian 
golden mean. Moral behaviour was found through carving D¶PLGGOHZD\·EHWZHHQtwo extremes 
and, wKHUHODXJKWHUZDVFRQFHUQHG¶WDFW·DQG¶ZLWWLQHVV·were desirable and they lay between 
                                                 
67 Hutcheson, Reflections, 32. 
68 Peter Borsay, The English Urban Renaissance: Culture and Society in the Provincial Town (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1989), 267. See also Klein, Shaftesbury, 3-8 and 96-101. 
69 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, 53. 
70 The Spectator, no. 381 (17 May 1712). 
 17 
buffoonery and boorishness.71 This was retained in the European civility tradition and, in 
England, scholars have traced a marked upswing the cultural prestige attached to wit from the 
turn of the seventeenth century. In English translations of European conduct guidance, the old 
(QJOLVKWHUP¶ZLW·³pertaining to the powers of the mind³was conflated with ingenuity, 
meaning inventiveness and imagination. It came to signify a celebrated ability to be entertaining, 
especially in terms of humorousness.72 The ability to sparkle in company continued to be 
advocated in eighteenth-century polite conduct guidance, and it also permeated less esteemed 
genres of print. Jestbooks, for example, were commonly published with tips for the delivery of 
their contents. The title page of The Nut-Cracker (1751) advertised its contents of ¶DQDJUHHDEOH
Variety of well-VHDVRQ·G-HVWV·DORQJZLWK¶6XFK,QVWUXFWLRQVDVZLOOHQDEOHDQ\0DQWR>«@FUDFN
a Nut without losing the Kernel·LHWHOOWKHMHVWVVXFFHVVIXOO\73 When Hutcheson claimed that 
ODXJKWHUFRXOG¶GLIIXVHFKHDUIXOQHVV·DQGVSUHDGD¶SOHDVDQWU\RIWHPSHU·, he was expanding on a 
point widely made: that laughter was not just an important part of sharing one another·V 
company, but³with its power to cultivate good humour³it also had a crucial role to play in 
fostering the social accord and agreeableness to which politeness aspired. To master the art of 
pleasing in company, a gentleman ought to have a certain cheerfulness and turn of wit. 
 Thus far in his third letter Hutcheson attended to laughing with others, but what should 
that laughter be targeted at? On this point, he contributed to deliberations about the ethics of 
ridicule and its rhetorical uses.74 The notion that laughter could correct behaviour had its roots in 
the satirists of Ancient Greece and Rome; by the early eighteenth century, it was an oft-repeated 
defence of the satirical mode.75 Writers repeatedly argued that satire upheld morality by 
subjecting vice to ridicule aQG+XWFKHVRQDJUHHV¶,IVPDOOHUIDXOWV[«] be set in a ridiculous 
OLJKW·KHZURWH¶WKHJXLOW\DUHDSWWREHPDGHVHQVLEOHRIWKHLUIROO\PRUHWKDQE\DEDUHJUDYH
DGPRQLWLRQ·76 Poking fun at foibles would alert offenders to their foolishness and, so the theory 
goes, they would adjust their behaviour accordingly. Yet, it was not just that peoplH·VEHKDYLRXU
                                                 
71 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, Book IV, ch. 8, quoted in Morreall, Philosophy of Laughter, 14-16. 
72 Phil Withington, Society in Early Modern England: The Vernacular Origins of some Powerful Ideas (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2010), 186-6HHDOVR0LFKHOH2·&DOODJKDQThe English Wits: Literature and Sociability in Early 
Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), and on civility in early modern England, 
Anna Bryson, From Courtesy to Civility: Changing Codes of Conduct in Early Modern England (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1998).  
73 Anon., The Nut-Cracker (London, 1751), title page.  
74 /DZUHQFH(.OHLQ¶5LGLFXOHDVD7RROIRU'LVFRYHULQJ7UXWK·LQ3DGG\%XOODUGHGThe Oxford 
Handbook of Eighteenth-Century Satire, (Oxford Handbooks Online, 2019); Roger Lund, Ridicule, Religion and 
the Politics of Wit in Augustan England (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012). 
75 Ashley Marshall, The Practice of Satire in England, 1658-1770 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2013); 48-53.  
76 Hutcheson, Reflections, 31. 
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could be corrected in this way; it was that doing so was more effective than other means. The 
common explanation given was that satire entertained as it instructed, but Hutcheson elaborates 
further. He argues that if we are challenged directly on our faults, we tend to entrench our 
positions as we defend ourselves; gentle ridicule, on the other hand, puts as at ease and we are 
more minded to change. The keyword, however, is gentle. Only if our faults are made ridiculous 
¶ZLWKJRRGQDWXUH·KHDUJXHVFDQLWEH¶WKHOHDVWRIIHQVLYHDQGPRVWHIIHFWXDOUHSURRI·77 
 )XUWKHUFDYHDWVDUHOLWWHUHGWKURXJKRXW+XWFKHVRQ·VWKLUGOHWWHUQRWOHDVWDVKHGLVFXVVHV
¶UXOHVWRDYRLGDEXVHRIWKLVNLQGRIULGLFXOH·78 First, ridicule must target only our minor flaws, or 
habits that are alterable¶The HQRUPRXVFULPHRUJULHYRXVFDODPLW\RIDQRWKHU·RU¶DSLHFHRI
FUXHOEDUEDULW\RUWUHDFKHURXVYLOODLQ\·DUH not fit subjects for ridicule. Similarly, laughter should 
QRWEHWDUJHWHGDW¶LPSHUIHFWLRQVZKLFKRQHFDQQRWDPHQG·. Were we to be caught laughing on 
VXFKRFFDVLRQVLWZRXOGUDLVHGLVJXVWDWWKH¶ZDQWRIDOOFRPSDVVLRQ·RU¶KDUGQHVVRIKHDUWDQG
LQVHQVLELOLW\·VXFKODXJKWHUH[SUHVVHG79 A further tranche of prohibited targets for ridicule are 
those categorised DVEHLQJ¶HYHU\ZD\JUHDW·ZKHWKHUDJUHDWEHLQJFKDUDFWHURUVHQWLPHQW 
Primarily, the discussion here revolves around religion. Laughter targeted at divine objects or 
sentiments was a persistent source of anxiety in early modern society,80 EXW+XWFKHVRQ·VWKHRU\
of laughter also contains a logical rationale for its inappropriateness. If oXU¶VHQVHRIWKH
ULGLFXORXV·UHOLHVRQWKHSHUFHSWLRQRIVXUSULVLQJUHVHPEODQFHVobjects that are ¶HYHU\ZD\JUHDW·
cannot bear a resemblance to meanness and thus cannot be brought into a ludicrous pairing. 
6WHSSLQJEDFNIURP+XWFKHVRQ·VWH[W, however, it is hard to escape evidence suggesting 
that people did find plenty of hilarity in the targets Hutcheson condemns. In surviving jestbooks 
from the period, jokes at the expense of the poor, the disabled, or the otherwise unfortunate 
come thick and fast. There are tales of tricks played on blind people or amputees, or people with 
dwarfism gleefully thrown down chimneys or hung on tenterhooks.81 One jestbook was divided 
into subsections, including ¶2I&URRNHGQHVVDQG/DPHQHVV·¶2I)DFHVDQG6FDUV· and ¶2I
%HJJDUV·82 while a dictionary of slang hinted at the verbal assault suffered by the physically 
imSDLUHGGHILQLQJWKHWHUP¶/RUG·DVVODQJIRU¶DFURRNHGRUKXPS-EDFNHGPDQ·LWZHQWRQWR
say the following: 
 
                                                 
77 Ibid., 31. 
78 Ibid., 35. 
79 Ibid., 30-31. 
80 For an exploration in the context of the European renaissance, see Michael A. Screech, Laughter at the 
Foot of the Cross (London: Allen Lane, 1997). See also Ingvild Saelid Gilhus, Laughing Gods and Weeping 
Virgins: Laughter in the History of Religion (London, Routledge, 1997). 
81 Examples discussed in Dickie, Cruelty and Laughter, esp. chapters 1 and 2. 
82 Anon., The Laugher; or, the Art of Jesting (London, 1760). 
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7KHVHXQKDSS\SHRSOHDIIRUGJUHDWVFRSHIRUYXOJDUUDLOOHU\VXFKDV¶'LG\RXFRPH
straight from home? If so, you have got confoundedly bent by WKHZD\·¶'RQ¶t abuse the 
JHQWOHPDQ·DGGVDE\-VWDQGHU¶KHKDVEeHQJURVVO\LQVXOWHGDOUHDG\GRQ·W\RXVHHKLV
EDFN·VXS"83 
 
This is to say nothing of the sexual and scatological content.84 Material such as this was once 
explained away E\FODVVLI\LQJLWDV¶SRSXODU·KXPRXUZLWKthe implication that it was not for the 
politer sorts, but this has been difficult to sustain in the face of evidence to the contrary. On the 
basis of price alone, these texts must have been produced for customers of means: ranging from 
1 shilling and 6 pence to as much as 5 shillings, they were beyond the purchasing power of the 
lower orders. Ownership is more problematic to establish but, where discovered, it is further 
proof that jestbooks were read by men and women of the middling sort.85 The presence of rude 
and cruel humour in polite society has often been explained in terms of hypocrisy: this was ¶DQ
impolite society that talked a great deal DERXWSROLWHQHVV·86 Knowledge of what people were 
laughing at certainly UHLQIRUFHVWKHQHHGWRLQWHUSUHW+XWFKHVRQ·VFRPPHQWVDVSUHVFriptive, but 
it is also worth recognising that he was under no illusions: his effort to delineate appropriate 
targets for laughter was driven partly by his recognition of ¶WKHLPSHUWLQence, and pernicious 
WHQGHQF\RIJHQHUDOXQGLVWLQJXLVKHGMHVWV·.87 By setting out moral and refined behaviour with 
respect to laughter, then, Hutcheson was knowingly offering conduct guidance. 
 +XWFKHVRQ·Vsecond caveat to the merits of ridicule concerns who was doing the 
ridiculing. He wrote: 
 
Ridicule, OLNHRWKHUHGJHGWRROVPD\GRJRRGLQDZLVHPDQ·VKDQGVWKRXJKIRROVPD\
cut their fingers with it, or be injurious to an unwary by-stander.88 
 
Polite conduct literature routinely instructed readers to adjust their behaviour according to their 
company,89 and this approach also underpins +XWFKHVRQ·VDGYLFH6SHDNLQJGLUHFWO\WRKLV
DXGLHQFHRIJHQWOHPHQFRIIHHKRXVHJRHUVKHZDUQVWKDW¶ZHRXJKWWREHFDXWLRXVRIRXU
FRPSDQ\·:LWK¶PHQRIVHQVH·+XWFKHVRQFRQVLGHUVLWDFFHSWDEOHWRYHQWXUH¶WKHEROGHVWZLW·
EXWDURXQG¶SHRSOHRIOLWWOHMXGJHPHQW·PXFKPRUHFDUHLVQHHGHGDVWKH\PD\IDLOWRVSRWWKH
                                                 
83 Francis Grose, A Classical Dictionary of the Vulgar Tongue (London, 1785). 
84 6HH'DYLVRQ¶2FFDVLRQDO3ROLWHQHVV·-8, and Gatrell, City of Laughter, 178-209. 
85 Dickie, Cruelty and Laughter, 30-32. On jestbooks as a genre, see also Ian Munro and Anne Lake 
3UHVFRWW¶-HVW%RRNV·LQ$QGUHZ+DGILHOGHGThe Oxford Handbook of English Prose 1500-1640 (Oxford: 
Oxford University press, 2013), 343-358. 
86 .QLJKWVDQG0RUWRQ¶,QWURGXFWLRQ·6HHDOVR'LFNLHCruelty and Laughter, 1-15, and Gatrell, City of 
Laughter, 176-177. 
87 Hutcheson, Reflections, 34. 
88 Ibid., 34-5. 
89 'DYLVRQ¶2FFDVLRQDO3ROLWHQHVV· 
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OXGLFURXVQDWXUHRIWKHFRPSDULVRQDQGWDNHWKHVLPLODULW\DWIDFHYDOXHKHQFHEHLQJ¶OHGLQWR
neglect, or FRQWHPSWRIWKDWZKLFKLVWUXO\YDOXDEOH·90 5LGLFXOHLQWKHSUHVHQFHRI¶ZHDN
FRPSDQ\·was to be avoided, as they lack a ¶MXVWGLVFHUQPHQWRIWUXHJUDQGHXU·Dnd are thus apt 
to misjudge appropriate targets of laughter. In this respect, Hutcheson carves out a distinction in 
society on the basis of intellectual capacity and judgement. That much is in line with 
conventional ideas about the aesthetic appreciation possessed by those with refined taste: taste 
was, after all, nothing of not a marker of status. But +XWFKHVRQ·VGLVWLQFWLRQis also about gender. 
Just as his WKHRU\RPLWVVRFLHW\·VORZHURUGHUV and skims over the existence of impolite humour, 
he is also silent on the question of ZRPHQ·VOaughter. This was an omission he shared with 
ULGLFXOH·VJUHDWDGYRFDWH6KDIWHVEXU\ZKRKDGZULWWHQ¶LQGHIHQFHRQO\RIWKHOLEHUW\RIWKH&OXE
DQGRIWKDWVRUWRIIUHHGRPZKLFKLVWDNHQDPRQJJHQWOHPHQ·91 Hutcheson and Shaftesbury·V 
exclusion of women points to anxieties generated QRWMXVWE\ODXJKWHUEXWE\ZRPHQ·VODXJKWHU
in particular. This is a topic that has received little scholarly attention, but it is clear that moral 
philosophers were not alone in advising against women·V use of laughter and wit.92 :RPHQ·V
conduct guidance was as intricate as that targeted at men and showed a similar concern for 
moderation, poise and self-restraint.93 For women, however, chastity and passivity were essential 
and laughter was thought to jeopardise both. One conduct boRNQRWHGWKDWZRPHQ·VODXJKWHU
could be read as a sign of licentiousness. Laughing aloud revealed a knowingness that belied 
modesty: when a young woman laughs, wrote the author¶VKHLVEHOLHYHGWRNQRZPRUHWKDQVKH
VKRXOGGR·94 Another conduct book³one of the most prominent for women in the period and 
also written by a man³advised that ¶PHQRIWKHEHVWVHQVHKDYHEHHQXVXDOO\DYHUVHWRWKH
WKRXJKWRIPDUU\LQJDZLWW\IHPDOH·; GRPHVWLFKDUPRQ\UHTXLUHGHDVH¶%XWZHFDQQRWEHHDV\
where we are not safe. We DUHQHYHUVDIHLQWKHFRPSDQ\RIDFULWLF·$QGFRQWLQXHG¶:KRLVQRW
shocked by the flippant impertinence of a self-conceited woman, that wants to dazzle by the 
VXSSRVHGVXSHULRULW\RIKHUSRZHUV"·95 7KHDQ[LHW\KHUHLVURRWHGLQODXJKWHU·VSHUFHLYHGIRUFHD
wife laughing at her husband could be a moment of challenge to the patriarchal power relations 
                                                 
90 Hutcheson, Reflections, 35. 
91 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, 75. 
92 Two works on the topic are Pamela Allen Brown, Better a Shrew than a Sheep: Women, Drama, and the 
Culture of Jest in Early Modern England (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); Audrey Bilger, Laughing 
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University Press, 1998). 
93 )RUDQH[SORUDWLRQRIZRPHQ·VSROLWHQHVVVHHSoile Ylivuori, Women and Politeness in Eighteenth-Century 
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94 John Gregory, $)DWKHU·V/HJDF\WRKLV'DXJKWHUV, 4th edn. (London, 1774), 59. 
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that pervaded society. Hutcheson was one among many to prescribe carefully who ought to 
wield the power of ridicule.  
The GLVFXVVLRQRI¶WKHHIIHFWVRI/DXJKWHU· LQ+XWFKHVRQ·VWKLUGOHWWHU makes a robust 
case for its importance in the service of genial sociability and for the power of ridicule to correct 
minor foibles, thus investing laughter with a key role in the maintenance of politeness in society. 
Nevertheless, his confidence in laughter·VPHULWV was tempered with qualifications, especially 
regarding the targets of ridicule and who was doing the ridiculing. He concluded, ¶LWPD\EHHDV\
WRVHHIRUZKDWFDXVHRUHQGDVHQVHRIWKHULGLFXORXVZDVLPSODQWHGLQKXPDQQDWXUH·EXW
also³crucially³¶KRZLWRXJKWWREHPDQDJHG·.96  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Since WKHSXEOLFDWLRQRI+XWFKHVRQ·VReflections Upon Laughter in 1750, philosophers have 
repeatedly explained human risibility in terms of our perception of incongruities. Later in the 
HLJKWHHQWKFHQWXU\-DPHV%HDWWLH·VHVVD\¶2Q/DXJKWHUDQG/XGLFURXV&RPSRVLWLRQ· invited 
readers to ¶LQFOLQHWR+XWFKHVoQ·VWKHRU\·, ZKLFKKHFRQVLGHUHG¶WKHEHVW·RIWKRVHKHGLVFXVVHG
before adding his own slight refinement: 
 
Laughter arises from the view of two or more inconsistent, unsuitable, or incongruous 
parts or circumstances, considered as united in one complex object or assemblage, or as 
acquiring a sort of mutual relation from the peculiar manner in which the mind takes 
notice of them.97 
 
For Beattie, we laugh when we perceive a fleeting compatibility between two otherwise 
LQFRPSDWLEOHREMHFWVEXWWKHFRQWUDVWEHWZHHQ¶GLJQLW\DQGPHDQQHVV·VRLPSRUWDQWWR
Hutcheson was set aside. The connection between laughter and incongruity can also be found in 
the writings of Immanuel Kant. In his Critique of Judgment, KHGHVFULEHGODXJKWHUDV¶DQDIIHFWLRQ
arising from the sudden transformation of a strainHGH[SHFWDWLRQLQWRQRWKLQJ·ZH laugh when 
we are prepared for one thing, but meet with another. The sudden shift experienced when we 
hear a joke generates a sensory pleasure, which ¶JLYHVDZKROHVRPHVKRFNWRWKHERG\·98 Into the 
nineteenth century, Arthur Schopenhauer argued that the ¶VRXUFHRIWKHOXGLFURXVLVDOZD\V
SDUDGR[LFDO·LWLVIRXQGLQDPLVPDWFKEHWZHHQRXUH[SHFWDWLRQVDQGDQH[SHULHQFHGUHDOLW\¶7KH
                                                 
96 Hutcheson, Reflections, 32. 
97 %HDWWLH¶2Q/DXJKWHU·-347. 
98 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment [1790], trans., James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
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SKHQRPHQRQRIODXJKWHU·KHZURWH¶DOZD\VVLJQLILHVWKHVXGGHQDSSUHKHQVLRQRIDQLQFRQJUXLW\
EHWZHHQWKHDEVWUDFWDQGWKHFRQFUHWHREMHFWRISHUFHSWLRQ·WKDWLVEHWZHHQRXULGHDRIWKLQJV
and our sensory experience of them.99 Reflecting on this tradition in 1987, the founder of the 
International Society for Humor Studies, John Morreall, recognised the merits of an incongruity 
theory of laughter and argued WKDW¶ZLWKSURSHUUHILQHPHQWLWFDQDFFRXQWIRUDOl cases of 
KXPRURXVODXJKWHU·100 Over and above superiority and relief theories, then, incongruity theories 
of laughter are still considered the most persuasiveVRLWLVOLWWOHZRQGHUWKDW+XWFKHVRQ·Vplace 
in the philosophy of laughter remains secure. 
 Construing +XWFKHVRQ·VReflections Upon Laughter VROHO\DVDQ¶LQFLSLHQWLQFRQJUXLW\
WKHRU\·KRZHYHUGHWDFKHVWKHWH[WIURPLWVKLVWRULFDOFRQWH[WDQGFRQVHTXHQWO\RYHUORRNVZKDW
was at stake when arguing about laughter in the early eighteenth-century. Reconnecting it to its 
contemporary cultural and intellectual debates addresses this blind spot and opens up three 
further concluding points. First, Reflections Upon Laughter emphasises that laughter mattered in 
eighteenth-century Britain and Ireland. For Hutcheson, it was a subject of fascination, which 
came with a long tradition of philosophical scrutiny and offered insights into his theories about 
human nature. It was also a source of unease: an everyday aspect oIVKDULQJRQHDQRWKHU·V
company, but one with a power that was all too easily abused. With careful management, 
however, he believed laughter was integral to the maintenance of politeness in society. 
Hutcheson was also confident that his subject would be of interest³and use³more widely 
among the newspaper readers of early eighteenth-century Dublin. He knew, as well as historians 
do now, that the polite world shared both his intrigue and ambivalence about laughter. Secondly, 
the arguments Hutcheson makes are instructive. In order to rescue laughter from the hostile 
characterisation bequeathed by earlier thinkers, he implicitly reveals polite aspirations: his effort 
to identify DQGGHILQHODXJKWHU·VUROHLQ agreeable sociability points to a desire for mutually 
pleasing social interactions, while his support for ridicule on the grounds that it corrected minor 
foibles expresses an ambition for conformity to a shared sense of acceptable conduct. His 
anxieties are equally telling. The condemnation of ¶XQGLVWLQJXLVKHGMHVWV· reveals an awareness 
that much humour of the time ZDVDQ\WKLQJEXWSROLWHZKLOHIHDUVDERXWZRPHQ·VODXJKWHU, or 
about ridicule among ¶ZHDNFRPSDQ\·, point to the inequalities of gender and status that 
permeated his society. Thirdly, all this emphasises that HXWFKHVRQ·VWH[Wshould be interpreted as 
more than a theory of laughter; it was a contribution to eighteenth-century moral philosophy and 
                                                 
99 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea [1819], trans., R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp, 6th edn. 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul), cited in Morreall, Philosophy of Laughter, 51. 
100 Morreall, Philosophy of Laughter, 130. 
 23 
polite cultural commentary. Its first purpose was to challenge Hobbesian conceptions of the 
innate selfishness of human nature and, in doing so, Hutcheson made a case for his theory of 
internal senses. Its second goal was to set a standard for how laughter ought to be used in 
society, and by whom. In this respect, it sat comfortably among the swathes of prescriptive 
literature published in the period, which attempted to refine minds and morals in the pursuit of 
politeness. Hutcheson argued his case through a focus on laughter, but his underlying intentions 
ran deeper than accounting for human chortles and chuckles. 
Laughter is an human universal, but it is also culturally and historically contingent: what 
makes us laugh has changed over time, and so too has how we think about and explain that 
laughter7KHTXHVWLRQ¶ZK\GRZHODXJK"·ZLOOJRRQEHLQJDVNHG, as it has done since antiquity, 
and new answers will be found, especially as scientific disciplines make their presence felt in a 
debate once dominated by philosophers.101 From an historical perspective, however, what 
matters is not what actually causes laughter, but why certain answers have been given at certain 
times. Taking this perspective, DQ\¶OLPLWDWLRQV· to +XWFKHVRQ·VReflections Upon Laughter are less 
important than what it reveals about culture and society in early eighteenth-century Britain and 
Ireland. 
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